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AN ACTUAL CASE: COLLATERAL SECURITY IN
AUTOMOBILES MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED
STATES AND MEXICO AND HELD BY A DEALER IN
SONORA
D. MICHAEL MANDIG*
DAVID EPSTEIN**

INTRODUCTORY NOTE BY PANELISTS:
As we all know, the North American Free Trade Agreement, contains
detailed provisions governing the resolution of country-to-country as well
as investor-country trade disputes. However, except with respect to intellectual property protection, 3 the resolution of disputes between private
trading partners, such as a Mexican creditor and a Canadian debtor, is
not directly governed by the treaty. Instead, Article 2022 of the NAFTA
requires the Parties to "encourage and facilitate the use of arbitration
and other means of alternative dispute resolution [such as mediation and
conciliation] for the settlement of international commercial disputes between private parties" in the NAFTA region .4
But what of conventional court litigation? The treaty merely states a
preference for alternatives to court litigation. It does not "sunset" the
courts. So, unless private parties doing business in the region are thoughtful enough to include arbitration and other alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) provisions in their contracts, resort to the courts may be unavoidable. While the courts often appear ill-equipped to handle international
business problems, that is not always the case, as illustrated by the
following example of how Mexican and U.S. courts can work together
to solve common problems:
D. Michael Mandig: This is an actual case that raises issues all too
often discussed only in the academic context. The litigation in this case
is a textbook for international litigation, particularly with respect to
Mexico and the United States.
My client is a company called General Motors Acceptance Corporation
de Mexico (GMAC). It is an affiliate of General Motors Corporation.
General Motors (GM) has a Mexican manufacturing operation in Mexico,

* Lead counsel for the Plaintiff in the referenced case. Member of the National Law Center
for Inter-American Trade (NLCIFT) and chair of the Civil Procedure Subcommittee of the ArizonaSonora Judicial Relations Task Force, a joint project of the Supreme Courts of Arizona and Sonora.
** Director, Office of Foreign Litigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex. (effective Jan. 1,
1994), 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTAI.
2. Id. chs. 11,19, & 20.
3. Id. arts. 1714-1718.
4. Id. art. 2022(1).
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General Motors de Mexico. It manufactures automobiles and trucks which
it then distributes through a series of dealerships just as in the United
States. The dealerships are scattered throughout Mexico-at last count
there were more than 130 dealerships.
Financing of automobile dealer inventories in Mexico is a rather tricky
proposition. When I became involved with GMAC, they were utilizing
a nationwide system of consignment arrangements under which GM would
manufacture a car, a dealer would order a car, and GM would ship the
car to the dealership. GMAC would buy the car, pay GM for it and
retain ownership. Technically, then, this was an inventory consignment
to the dealer under the terms of which GMAC would consign inventory
to each of the GM dealers which elected to finance inventory through
consignments. This process is necessary in Mexico because Mexico has5
.r
no counterpart to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (T C
nor does Mexico have title and lien laws like those in the United States
for secured inventory financing.
What happened in this case? GMAC conducted business with a gentleman who owned five dealerships in the State of Sonora, Mexico. In
December 1992, GMAC discovered that this dealer, who had five separate
corporations with facilities in five separate Sonoran cities, was severely
in excess of his credit line. GMAC dispatched a couple of individuals
from its Mexico City headquarters to the dealer's primary location in
Hermosillo, Sonora, and sent some auditors to the other four dealership
locations. A quick audit revealed that the dealer was what the trade
describes as "out of trust" to the extent of some 755 vehicles. There
were 755 vehicles missing which, according to inventory reports furnished
to GMAC by its field auditors, were supposed to be on the lots. It is
unclear to this day whether the automobiles were sold or otherwise
disposed of. Nonetheless, the result was a bill of approximately $12,500,000.
GMAC, through its counsel in Detroit, Michigan, hired a lawyer in
Mexico City who was dispatched to Hermosillo. That lawyer then hired
local counsel, and they filed three lawsuits in the state of Sonora-one
in Hermosillo, one in Guaymas, and the third in Nogales, Sonora, which
shares the border with Nogales, Arizona. Someone suspected the dealer
owned Arizona real estate. We investigated the matter, and found a
townhouse with title held jointly in the name of the majority shareholder
in each of the five corporations and his wife. We attached the townhouse
in a prejudgment attachment without notice.
Because we suspected the defendants might also have been banking in
the United States, we garnished every bank which conducts business in
southern Arizona. One garnishment produced results. The dealer had,
over a six year span and through a series of four bank accounts at Bank
One in Arizona, deposited and withdrawn roughly $13.7 million dollarsstrangely close to the same amount owed GMAC. We were dismayed to
learn that by the time we garnished the bank accounts only about $70,000

5. U.C.C. § 9.
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remained. This is typical for these kinds of situations. In any case, two
bank accounts were corporate accounts in the names of two of the
dealerships-Mexican corporations-and two accounts were personal, in
the name of the majority owner and his wife. There was a lot of activity
between and among the Arizona bank accounts.
Arizona has a racketeering statute, 6 which at the time was more extensive
in scope than the federal racketeering laws. 7 We amended our complaint
to add a racketeering claim and attempted to determine whether the
moneys going into and out of the bank accounts could be traced to the
sale of the inventory.
The version of Arizona's racketeering laws which applied to our case
provided a private cause of action for treble damages to any person
injured as a result of "racketeering," 8 a defined term which, in our case
through a scheme or artifice to defraud and
included obtaining money
"money laundering." 9 Our objective was to show that GMAC's vehicles
were disposed of by the dealers through fraudulent practices and breach
of trust and the proceeds of their disposition "laundered" in some fashion
through Arizona's banking system.1°
At this point we realized that a lawsuit begun with the purpose of
seizing property in aid of foreign litigation became a case of the "tail
wagging the dog." When we learned of the significant connection to
Arizona, we figured that it would take two to three years to obtain final
judgments in the "juicios ordinarios"11 that had been commenced in
Sonora. By that time it would be difficult to apply pressure to this dealer
to see if he had any money hidden away. We advised the client to press
the U.S. litigation a bit harder, as we believed it would be quicker to
obtain judgment in the United States than to await judgment in the

6. Asuz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2301 to 13-2317 (1996) [hereinafter Arizona Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)].
7. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968
(West Supp. 1997).
8. Arizona RICO Act, supra note 6, § 2314.
9. Id. § 2301(D)(4).
10. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. They asserted forum non conveniens, personal
jurisdiction and contractual forum selection clauses as support for dismissal. The trial court denied
the motions, holding that the plaintiff should be given an opportunity to conduct discovery to prove
money laundering. The judge believed that if money laundering and Arizona RICO violations could
be proven, dismissal would be inappropriate. On the other hand, the Court also ruled that the
forum selection issues would be revisited if discovery did not reveal that proceeds of unlawful
activity in Mexico were laundered or used to buy property in Arizona.
11. In Mexican civil procedure there are two principal types of civil actions: the juicio ejecutivo
[executive action] and the juicio ordinario [ordinary action]. The principal distinction between the
two types of suits is that the executive action, which is based upon particular types of debt
instruments called tiulos ejecutivos [execution papers], is an accelerated case in which special
provisional remedies-such as the appointment of third parties akin to receivers-are available. In
ordinary actions such provisional arrangements are either seldom granted or not legally available.
In addition, the executive action permits only a limited list of matters to be raised as affirmative
defenses. In ordinary actions, many more legal and factual defenses can be raised. See J. OvALLE
FAVELA, DERcno PROCESAt CwVn. 361-84, 51-105 (6th ed. 1994). The ordinary action is, as logic
suggests, slow, cumbersome and inefficient compared with the executive action and is not favorably
regarded by creditors and their attorneys.
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Mexican litigation. The idea was to get a judgment in the United States
it in Mexico, if possible. The client consented, and we moved
and enforce
2
ahead .
This case has been both a textbook and a laboratory. It has taught
us some peculiar lessons. Our first mistake related to translation of the
forms used to make service of process on the defendants in Mexico.
Testing and certification for court translators in the U.S. federal court
system is extremely rigorous. Less than ten percent of those who take
the exam to get the license pass. We sent letters of request and letters
rogatory for service with a translation by a court-certified translator in
the United States. I am not certain whether there was concern about the
translation's validity or some other factor, but the Mexican court which
handled the service of process in Hermosillo insisted that the papers be
re-translated by an official translator selected by the court in Hermosillo.' 3
That translation cost us $2,000.
The only way to plan for that situation might be to carefully select
your translator, and ask the court which will serve process in Mexico
what its requirements will be. There is no system for training and
qualifying court translators in Mexico, so the preferred option is to use
a certified translator in the United States, work closely with that individual
as the translation is being made and not blindly accept the translation
given you. We used a top-notch translator in Arizona, and GMAC had
extremely competent local counsel in Hermosillo. The two of us are quite
conversant with the legal jargon of the other's procedural systems. We
combed through the translations in every instance to ensure we were
saying what we meant to say in both languages. We wanted to avoid
being tripped up by an inaccurate translation. The translation is something
that should never be overlooked, especially when it involves complicated
arrangements such as ours.
David Epstein: Let me add a few comments on the service of process
issue. My office in the U.S. Department of Justice is the Office of
Foreign Litigation in the Civil Division. It serves as the central authority
in the United States for the Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory.' 4 The procedures for service are relatively simple. Forms are
available at the U.S. Marshal's Office for service in both English and
Spanish. You send your papers in after they are filed with the court
and we authenticate them. We send them to the Mexican Ministry of
Foreign Affairs under the Inter-American Convention.
12. Enforcement of the judgment in Mexico was not regarded, of course, as a foregone conclusion.
This is especially so because the provisions of Mexico's procedural codes leave open the possibility
of substantial and time-consuming litigation to procure recognition and enforcement of out-ofcountry judgments. See generally, D. Michael Mandig, Inter-American Dispute Resolution: The Role
for Border State Judicial Cooperation, published in: 1 TOWARD SEAmi.Ess BORDERS: MAKING FRE
TRADE WORK 'N THE AmaRicAs 716, 760-78 (1993).
13. That problem did not arise with all courts with which we dealt. The Mexican federal district
court accepted our papers when we submitted evidence. However, the service papers in the State
of Hermosillo had to be translated again.
14. Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory, Jan. 30, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 339 [hereinafter
Inter-American Convention or Convention].
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That treaty was implemented slowly in the late 1980s. We were pretty
discouraged for a couple of years because many service requests never
returned. They literally disappeared. Fortunately, we have seen progress
in recent years. Documents are returning to us now on a fairly regular
basis-not without some difficulty and problems-but there is considerable
improvement, and the statistics show it. Six months to a year for service
is probably an accurate estimate.
There is also an exclusivity issue under the Convention. The U.S. State
Department advises the American public that the Convention is the
exclusive means for service of process in Mexico, which of course has
implications if you want to subsequently enforce a judgment there. However, other service of process methods have been used, so it is not entirely
clear whether the Convention really is exclusive or whether you can
properly use those other abbreviated procedures. I advise people who
call me to use both a long and a short route if they can find one for
personal service. Mr. Mandig served papers in this case under the Convention's Border States Provision. 5 This provision allows for direct transmission from a border state to the court in Mexico. This raises other
issues about separate authentication and legalization if you do not utilize
the central authority in Washington, D.C.
Mandig: There are lower court decisions in the United States which
create some confusion as to whether the Inter-American Convention is
the only means of serving process in foreign jurisdictions that are parties
to it.16 I have a difficult time squaring decisions which hold the InterAmerican Convention to be non-exclusive with the Supreme Court's
decision that the Hague Convention on Service of Process17 is, in fact,
exclusive. 8 I tell my clients and other lawyers to follow the Convention,
just to be on the safe side. If you are able to use the court-to-court
transfer mechanism, it is probably not going to be that difficult for you.
We had no problems serving process in Sonora.
Questions arise as to whether it is appropriate under the Inter-American
Convention and the Additional Protocol19 to use a direct court-to-court
transmission of letters rogatory. There is some debate about whether the
Additional Protocol was intended to supplant the provisions of the Con-

15. Id. art. 7. Article 7 provides:
Courts in border areas of the States Parties may directly execute the letters rogatory
ontemplated in this Convention and such letters shall not require legalization.
16. Compare Pizzabiocche v. Vinelli, 772 F.Supp. 1245, 1249 (M.D.FIa. 1991) (service in Uruguay
and Argentina was not required to be made under the Inter-American Convention, even though
the U.S., Argentina and Uruguay are all parties to the treaty and its Additional Protocol), with

De Torres v. Arocena, 587 N.Y.S.2d 495, 498 (Sup. 1992) (service in Uruguay required to be made
in accord with the Inter-American Convention, which the Court held preempted inconsistent state
service rules).
17. Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra-Judicial Documents in Civil or
Commercial Matters, opened for signature Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, 658
U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter Hague Service Convention or Service Convention].
18. Volkswagenwerk, AG v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988).
19. Additional Protocol to the Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory, May 8, 1979,

18 I.L.M. 1238 [hereinafter Additional Protocol].
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vention, which allow for court-to-court transfers, 20 or whether the Additional Protocol is merely a declaratory statement of "how to do it if
you serve by means of a central authority." We took the position that
if we sent papers to Mexico City, we might never see them again. We
therefore served process by letters of request addressed by the Superior
Court in Arizona directly to the State Courts in Hermosillo, Nogales,
and Guaymas. This approach has presented no problems thus far, and
the Mexican Courts accept the Letters even though not submitted through
the circuitous route of the Central Authority. Furthermore, there are no
decided cases which 2 question the availability of court-to-court transfers
of Letters Rogatory .

In any case, the Defendants sought dismissal on forum non conveniens
and personal jurisdiction grounds. They also asserted forum selection
clauses contained in the contracts and specified Mexico City as the forum
of choice. The Arizona court found personal jurisdiction over the individual and two of the corporate defendants, and declined to rule on
the forum selection and forum non conveniens issues pending completion
of discovery to determine whether money laundering occurred. And even
though the court found the merits of the underlying contract claims to
be basically undisputed, it declined GMAC's initial requests for summary
judgment against the four defendants over whom it found personal
jurisdiction could be asserted.
We tried to conduct discovery from the adverse parties. They refused
to comply with any requests for discovery, and refused to comply with
several Arizona discovery orders. Consequently, the court reached what
it had described as the undisputed merits of the case and granted us a

20. See D. McClean, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE 71 (1992) (claiming that the Additional
Protocol is a "substantial revision" of the Inter-American Convention which supposedly mandates
use of the Central Authority to the exclusion of the diplomatic, consular and direct judicial channels

described in Article 4 of the Inter-American Convention).
21. In fact, to argue that the Additional Protocol supplants Article 4 of the Inter-American
Convention it was intended to supplement does violence to the language of the Inter-American
Convention and the Additional Protocol and, in short, makes no sense. Article 4 of the Convention
says that Letters Rogatory may be transmitted to the executing court "through judicial channels,
diplomatic or consular agents, or the Central Authority of the State of origin of the State of
destination, as the case may be." Inter-American Convention, supra note 14, art. 4. Article 4 also

mandates that signatories to the Convention notify the General Secretariat of the Organization of
American States of their designation of the "Central Authority." Id. The Additional Protocol merely
says that the notice of designation must be made when the State deposits its instruments of ratification
or accession with the General Secretariat, and requires the Secretariat to distribute a list of Central
Authority designations to all States Parties to the Convention. Additional Protocol, supra note 19,
art. 2. The Additional Protocol does, by its terms, exclude application of the Convention to
proceedings for the gathering of evidence. See id., art. I (excluding application of Article 2(b) of
the Convention). However, the Additional Protocol does not attempt any express limitation or
exclusion of any other term or provision of the Inter-American Convention. In fact, the Additional

Protocol does only three things: The Protocol implements the terms of the United States' reservation
excluding the application of the Convention to evidence-gathering procedures; it provides details for
informing States Parties of the identities of all designated Central Authorities; and it provides forms
for using the Convention to effect service of process. It does not purport to eliminate judicial,
consular or diplomatic channels as alternatives to the Central Authority mechanism.
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judgment on the contract claims for about 77 million pesos due to the
failure to comply with its orders.2
Despite the fact that the trial court judge granted us judgment on the
contract claims, it remained important for us to continue pursuit of the
money laundering claims. This was so because opposing counsel asserted
the usual defenses of absence of personal jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, and forum selection. The Arizona court denied a motion to
dismiss because, if we had proof of money laundering in Arizona, that
would provide a sufficient connection to Arizona to justify asserting
personal jurisdiction. The reasoning behind denying the forum non conveniens and forum selection clause arguments is not clear, but we think
the judge concluded that a Mexican court probably would not apply and
enforce a judgment rendered under the Arizona state racketeering laws.
Of necessity, it seemed the case should remain in Arizona for the purpose
of litigating the racketeering claim.
Because the defense failed to cooperate, we needed to find a way to
collect the evidence that might demonstrate that the money entering and
leaving Arizona came from the proceeds of the sale of GMAC's inventory.
We utilized the Hague Evidence Convention2 3 to achieve this goal.
We quickly recognized that since we were not getting any information
from the defendants voluntarily or by court order, we were going to
have to obtain information from third parties. After further investigation,
we discovered there were probably a dozen banks and financial leasing
companies in Mexico which had been doing business with the dealerships
over a period of years. We wanted to know what the bank records would
reveal with respect to disposition of the inventory proceeds. We moved
cautiously under the Evidence Convention, and we were able to trace
some of the movement of the funds into the United States back to some
of these banks.
If you are careful and work hard and closely with competent Mexican
counsel, you can accomplish much more than the stereotypical view of
the Mexican court system would lead you to believe. In our case we
needed a tremendous amount of paper from a large number of Mexican
financial institutions. Mexico has a bank secrecy law, but it does not
apply to court orders. We therefore asked the trial judge in Arizona to
issue letters of request under the Evidence Convention asking the federal
district court in Hermosillo to issue citaciones-the Mexican equivalent
of subpoenas-to these various entities so they would produce documents
and later give testimony.
One question which troubled me was whether we would appear like
a bunch of U.S. lawyers run amok on a fishing expedition. I was concerned
because I had previously spoken informally with Dr. Jose Luis Sequieros,

22. Appendix, Items A & B.
23. Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters,
opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter
Evidence Convention]. The Evidence Convention prescribes certain procedures by which a judicial
authority in one contracting State may request evidence located in another contracting State.
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the author of Mexico's Article 23 reservation to the Evidence Convention,
and asked him his intent when he wrote the Article. He made it clear
that while Mexico intended to allow document discovery for use in U.S.
litigation, the limitations of Mexico's Article 23 reservation were
intended
24
to ensure some judicial control over inquisitive U.S. lawyers.
We decided to do what we would do with any judge in the United
States. We tried to explain to the Mexican judge what was happening
in the litigation in the United States so he would understand clearly that
there was a case pending; that there was a judge supervising our actions;
and that the information we sought was of vital importance to the litigation
in the United States. How could we do that? Along with issuing the
letters of request filed in Superior Court in Tucson, we asked our Arizona
judge to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law, which he did. 2
Though they were of a preliminary nature, the findings were proposed
based on the preliminary evidence of money laundering occurring with
Mexican financial institutions serving as conduits in some fashion. This
served as a judge-to-judge request for help in collecting evidence needed
to adjudicate the case in Tucson, Arizona and made clear to the Mexican
court that our judge was actively involved in managing this aspect of
the case.
The letters of request, findings of fact, and conclusions of law were
translated into Spanish and presented to the federal district judge in
Hermosillo, Sonora, following the court-to-court transmission method
permitted by Mexico's Article 27 declaration.2 6 Even following all these
procedures, we got tripped up with the translation. When we translated
the papers, we translated inspection as "inspeccidn." That created problems because under Mexican civil and mercantile procedure, there is a

24. Article 23 of the Evidence Convention states:
A Contracting State may at the time of signature, ratification or accession, declare
that it will not execute Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pretrial discovery of documents as known in Common Law countries.
Mexico's reservation says that it will permit pre-trial discovery of documents if (a) there is a
judicial proceeding pending, (b) the documents sought are reasonably identifiable as to date, subject
and other relevant information, and reasonably believed to be in the possession or under the control
of the person from whom they are sought and. (c) a direct relationship between the requested
documents and the pending proceeding is identified. See Aclaraciones y Reservas del Gobierno de
Md4xico de la Convenci6n, §§ 4(a)-(c) (reprinted in L. Pereznieto Castro, DRECHO INTERNACIONAL
PsuvADo 354 (D. Michael Mandig trans., 6th ed. 1995) [hereinafter Aclaraciones y Reservas].
25. See Appendix, Item C.
26. Article 27 of the Evidence Convention permits adopting jurisdictions to declare that Letters
of Request may be transmitted to its judicial authorities through other than the Central Authority.
Evidence Convention, supra note 23, art. 27(a).
Mexico's Article 27 declaration states that diplomatic, consular and judicial channels may be used
in lieu of the Central Authority route. See Aclaraciones y Reservaciones, supra note 25, § 5. The
United States apparently did not adopt this more agile approach, and Letters of Request under the
Evidence Convention may apparently only be sent through the Department of Justice in Washington,
D.C. On the other hand, direct actions to obtain information for use in foreign tribunals are
authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1782. Section 1782 is a much simpler, less cumbersome procedure than
the Evidence Convention, and foreign litigants should consult U.S. counsel regarding its use. See
generally, D. Epstein & J. Snyder, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION: A GUIDE TO JURISDICTION, PRACTICE
AND STRATmGY §§ 10.13 & 10.15 (2d ed. 1994) (general discussion of 28 U.S.C. § 1782).
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procedure called inspecci6n judicial [judicial inspection] which is a cumbersome, time-consuming procedure by which, after a company makes
documents available, a court employee, an actuario,27 accompanies you
to the witness' place of business and goes through a painstaking process
of authenticating all the papers that are presented there. This presents
a good example of a procedure which appears to most U.S. lawyers to
be cumbersome, time-consuming, and unnecessary even in the Mexican
legal system. Especially in the context of disputes involving voluminous
documents, the inspecci6n judicial may be a process whose reform needs
to be addressed in the future.
The lady who was the actuaria in our case was a young and inexperienced attorney, but nevertheless bright and diligent. She dutifully
wrote everything down by hand during each judicial inspection. It was
her task to go through stacks of documents, essentially one document
at a time, and to verify the nature and authenticity of the documents
presented to us by each of the Mexican companies summoned to present
evidence. Occasionally she needed an explanation from a company representative of what the documents were and how each one fit into the
daily routine of the bank, leasing company or foreign exchange house
we were visiting. It was a painstaking, slow process.
One day I told her I would bring my laptop computer, so I could
help her by typing everything instead. We set this document up on the
computer, with normal margins. She typed the order, and we printed it
on a portable printer. She told me when she saw the printout that the
margin had to be bigger. She showed me the way she had been handwriting
the information, and there was a margin about three inches wide along
the left-hand side of her handwritten minutes of our document review.
I asked her why there was such a wide margin, and she said her document
would become part of the court record. She showed me one of the
official court files, indicating that to make the documents part of the
court record she must first copy all the documents produced, authenticate
the copies and then physically place them into the official court files.
To place the documents received from each witness into the court file,
holes are poked into the left hand margin, and the piles of documents
are then bound together with string. That is how the Mexican courts
maintain all paper files, both in the federal and state courts in Sonora.
Unfortunately, Mexico does not devote enough resources to the judicial
function. Now is a good time for them to start. Once the documents
are accumulated in the court file, the actuaria then prepares what is, in
effect, a return of execution, reciting for the U.S. court the details of
the collection of documents, their authentication and so on. This return

27. The term actuario does not have a simple, one-word translation. The actuario is an employee
of the court and a licensed attorney. The job of the actuario is essentially an entry-level position
on the judicial career track, and the actuario handles service of process and other formal notices,
judicial inspections and similar judicial procedures not required to be performed by judges or other
higher level judicial functionaries. See generally, Eduardo Pallares, DiccioNARio iE DERECHO PROcEsAL Crv 70 (20th ed. 1996).
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must then be authenticated, translated and transmitted back to the U.S.
requesting court.
Another quirk we encountered in this process dealt with deposition
taking. Depositions, as U.S. lawyers understand them, simply do not
exist in Mexican procedure. In fact, the word we use along the border
to say "deposition" in Spanish, deposicidn, is a potentially embarrassing
false cognate: Deposici6n is generally understood in the interior of Mexico
to be what you find in a baby's diaper, a fact pointed out to me by a
woman litigator from Zacatecas following a 1993 speech I gave about
comparative procedure at the first meeting of the Texas-Mexico Bar
Association. I had just been talking about if for an hour.
With this experience in mind, and mindful of the use to which I needed
to put our Mexican discovery in the U.S. litigation, I was concerned
about the type of testimony we would obtain from the financial institutions
when explaining what we saw in the documents. In the United States
we would make a request like, "Tell me what these bank statements
show." We wanted to make a similar request in our Mexican discovery.
We asked the Arizona judge to include in his findings explaining the
Letters of Request a holding that in his opinion the best way to get a
description of what we found in the bank records was for the Mexican
judge to nominate me, Michael Mandig, as the proper person to interrogate
the witnesses about the contents of their files. Many people told me that
would never happen because the Mexican judge would not give permission.
However, under Article 9 of the Evidence Convention2 8 and under the
special provisions in the Federal Civil Procedure Code, and Federal Code
of Commerce (each of which essentially codifies Article 9), we asked for
that permission. 2 9 The Mexican federal district judge granted our request.
Epstein: Let me make a few comments about the evidence procedure
Mr. Mandig followed in this case. The procedure seems to follow a trend
to which other Evidence Convention countries subscribe. Countries that

28. Article 9 of the Evidence Convention provides:
The judicial authority which executes a Letter of Request shall apply its own law
as to the methods and procedures to be followed.
However, it will follow a request of the requesting authority that a special method
or procedure be followed, unless this is incompatible with the internal law of the
State of execution or is impossible of performance by reason of its internal practice
and procedure or by reason of the practical difficulties.
A Letter of Request shall be executed expeditiously (emphasis added).
29. The 1988 Mexican federal statutory provisions codifying Article 9 of the Evidence Convention
are: Cddigo Federal de Procedimientos Civiles, art. 555; Cbdigo de Comercio, art. 1074(VII). Each
statutory provision says that evidence requests are to be executed in accordance with "national
laws," but says thatprocedures different from the national laws may be followed if requested either
by interested parties or by the court which issued the Letters of Request. The only proviso is that
neither orden ptiblico nor garantias individuales are violated. Orden pziblico, of course, is the
undefined concept of "public policy." The reference to garantias individuales, i.e., individual
guarantees, is likely a reference to the GarantiasIndividuales found in Articles 1 - 29 of the Mexican
Constitution. See Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, arts. 1 - 29. Presumably
the reference to individual guarantees relates principally to the basic due process rights of notice
and an opportunity to be heard. See id. arts. 13, 14 cls. 2 & 16. Precisely how these notions of
due process would limit the right to conduct discovery is difficult to say; there is simply no welldeveloped body of Mexican jurisprudence on the subject.
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are strict about gathering evidence are beginning to better understand
the U.S. pretrial discovery system. Most of the ingredients seem to be
in place for using the Evidence Convention in Mexico. The Mexican
federal district courts implement the Convention which allows ex parte
procedures. Article 9 of the Evidence Conventior provides a valuable
tool because it allows special procedures upon request. That is what Mr.
Mandig used in this case. Article 23 also provides a valuable method
for pretrial document production. 3 ' Thus, if you reasonably identify
documents and specify that they relate to litigation in the United States,
you may have means of obtaining needed information. Finally, as has
already been stressed, you need to hire a Mexican lawyer to walk through
the requests and to deal with the Mexican judges handling the evidence
requests. Let me add a further comment about how Mexico has taken
a reservation on the use of a commissioner as Mr. Mandig used in this
case.3 2 Under, for example, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure33 and
Article 17 of the Evidence Convention, a U.S. court could appoint Mr.
Mandig as a commissioner for the purpose of taking testimony in Mexico.
However, in this case the U.S. court did not make the appointment itself.
Mandig: Mr. Epstein is correct. And if the U.S. Judge had appointed
me directly, this would have caused problems. Mexico's reservation forbids
pursuit3 4 of evidence in Mexico by Commissioners appointed by foreign
courts

.

There is another interesting part to this case. The shape of the playing
field has changed considerably by the fact that the dealer is now in jail.
At the same time we began the litigation in the United States and the
commercial actions in Sonora, we lodged a querella3t with the State of
Sonora's Attorney General. The complaint languished for two and a half
years with few results. We pressed the issue harder recently to dispose
of the complaint and had a surprise: the Attorney General of Sonora
finally decided to file formal criminal charges in Sonoran state court.
The majority owner of the dealerships (one of the individual defendants

30. See supra text accompanying note 29.
31. See supra notes and discussion accompanying note 25.
32. Article 17 of the Evidence Convention provides:
In a civil or commercial matter, a person duly appointed as a commissioner for
the purpose may, without compulsion, take evidence in the territory of a Contracting
State in aid of proceedings commenced in the courts of another Contracting State
if(a) a competent authority designated by the State where the evidence is to be
taken has given its permission either generally or in the particular case; and
(b) he complies with the conditions which the competent authority has specified
in the permission.
A Contracting State may declare that evidence may be taken under this Article
without its prior permission.
33. F. R. Civ. P. 28(b)(4). This Rule is similar to Arizona's state procedural rule. See Ariz.
R. Civ. P. 28(b)(2).
34. See Aclaraciones y Reservaciones, supra note 25, § 3 (making an "express and complete"
reservation with respect to the provisions of Article 17 concerning use of commissioners).
35. A querella is essentially a criminal complaint, tiled by a private party and investigated by
the Attorney General.
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in the U.S. and Sonoran civil litigation) was arrested and is currently
residing in a Sonoran jail in lieu of a five million dollar bond. He is
under indictment for fraud and criminal breach of a fiduciary trust,
awaiting the completion of this criminal prosecution. 6 We are currently
pursuing other debt collection alternatives, not the least important of
which is a claim against a policy of insurance providing worldwide
coverage for losses due to dishonesty by GM's employees.
This case is instructive about Mexico's commercial financing laws. This
problem may well have been prevented by the existence of U.S.-type laws
regulating security "interests in motor vehicle inventories. In fact, an
additional eighty-five cars disappeared after the problem was discovered.
Why? Because there was no mechanism available under Mexican law to
seize the remaining inventory, the dealer continued to dispose of the
cars.
One might ask "Why did GMAC not try to retrieve the 700 missing
vehicles or try to attach or embarg 3 7 them in Mexico? What prevented
GMAC from terminating the consignment agreement and retrieving the
remaining vehicles once it determined the dealer was out of trust?" One
problem was a practical one: Our Mexican counsel advised us that, under
Mexican law, a thief cannot pass good title. Consequently, it would have
been legally possible for GMAC to make a car buyer pay twice. However,
as a marketing and a public relations matter, that was viewed as an
unwise decision for a national enterprise to undertake. With great trepidation, GMAC chose to enforce installment contracts against people who
purchased vehicles from the defendant dealerships, but who would not
voluntarily make their payments directly to GMAC. However, GMAC
did not take cars away from people who had actually paid for them.
That was viewed as one of those situations in which you simply have
to take the losses.
As far as the consignment agreement was concerned, GMAC's president
in Mexico had the dealer sign a document before a Mexican notary public
acknowledging GMAC's right to take possession of the remaining inventory. This was done as soon as the problem was discovered. With
the dealer's written authorization in hand, GMAC began hauling cars to
another dealer in Hermosillo. However, possession is 9/10s of the lawor maybe 10/10s in Mexico. I say this because, once the dealer's lawyers
got involved, they obtained arrest warrants to have my client's officers

36. Since the remarks of Mr. Mandig at the September conference, the criminal defendant's
bond was substantially reduced, posted and the defendant released. The criminal charges for breach
of fiduciary are still pending, and have survived district court and intermediate appellate review in
federal arnparo proceedings. For an excellent discussion of the Mexican concept of amparo, see H.
Fix Zamudio, A Brief Introduction to the Mexican Writ of Amparo, 9 CALn. W. INT'L L.J. 306
(1979).
37. An embargo is a seizure of property that can be obtained by a creditor if its claim is based
upon a titulo ejecutivo, thereby making use of a juicio ejecutivo possible. See supra note I 1 and
accompanying text; 2 DICCIONAR1O JURiDICO MEXICANO 1249-52 (8th ed. 1995). Because the con-

signment arrangement used by GMAC did not include use of t(tulos ejecutivos, a prejudgment
attachment, i.e., embargo, to preserve the remaining dealership inventory became more problematic.
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arrested for robbery. This was possible because under Mexican penal law
there was at least an argument that recovering the inventory, even with
the consent of the majority owner of the dealership, was robbery. In
fact, to obtain the arrest warrants, the dealer purported to revoke his
consent. GMAC's personnel rushed back to Mexico City and waited until
local counsel got the arrest warrants quashed.
These sorts of problems can likely be prevented with the kinds of
judicial or self-help remedies available under Article 9 of the U.S. Uniform
Commercial Code. Hopefully, recognizing the dire need for attracting
foreign capital to Mexico will cause Mexico to fall in line with the rest
of the world and adopt some needed reforms to its commercial financing
system.38
My client, GMAC, has revamped the way it conducts business in
Mexico. It is now in a partnership with a Mexican bank, which enables
GMAC to use some financing tools that would not otherwise be available.
GMAC is also modifying all contract documents to avoid these situations
in the future.
Epstein: Mr. Mandig's experience illustrates the need to consider using
the established procedures under the various conventions. Some lawyers
will have an occasional transnational case, including one in Mexico. Many
clients will lack the resources to send U.S. attorneys to Mexico. Consequently, the more you can rely on these treaties, which were designed
to be inexpensive and efficient, the better. When the day arrives that
Mexico starts enforcing foreign judgments, conformance with these procedures will place you in a much better position to have your judgment
enforced.
Mandig: I have been litigating and trying cases for about eighteen years
and have been involved in a fair amount of international and crossborder transactions. I have tried to come up with an estimate of costs
associated with a trans-border case, as opposed to one located within
the United States. My estimate is that cross-border litigation costs about
three times as much if you dot all "I's" and cross all "T's". This
includes complying with treaties, translating papers, traveling and visiting
judges to educate them about the case. This counsels strongly for the
use of alternative means of dispute resolution. On the other hand, Mexico
has what is called the juicio ejecutiv&9 which is much more effective in
getting somebody's attention than arbitration. One of the challenges is
combining court procedures with alternative dispute resolution procedures
in the future so that people trying to collect debts will have a range of
options available to work with.
QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS
Institute Member: Were you unopposed in the court in Arizona?
Mandig: No there has been a defense lawyer there since the beginning.
38. See generally, Boris Kozolchyk, Qui Hacer Sobre la Anticuada Ley de Garantia Prendaria
Mexicana, 12 ARIz. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 533 (1995).
39. See supra text accompanying note 11.
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Institute Member: Did the lawyer oppose all your efforts?
Mandig: Opposing counsel moved to dismiss the case on jurisdictional
and forum non conveniens grounds, but when we presented the request
for evidence letters, I do not think opposing counsel mounted much of
a defense.
Juan Zufiga, Katten Muchin & Zavis, Los Angeles, California: I have
a few comments and a question on what has been discussed here because
I process letters rogatory under the Inter-American Convention for the
Mexican Consulate in Los Angeles, California. I have the reverse view
of Mexican lawyers processing letters rogatory to U.S. courts. I have
seen instances of Mexican judges from outlying states, not so much from
Mexico City and the federal district, processing the letters rogatory directly
to my client, the Mexican Consulate, as opposed to going through diplomatic channels in an attempt to bypass Mexico City. The Mexican
Consulate accepts such a form of letter rogatory and then gives it to
me to obtain an order from Superior Court to serve a summons and
complaint, or something of that nature. The California courts regularly
accept these requests. I would like to emphasize for the Mexican lawyers
using that process to follow Mr. Mandig's advice-check your translations
closely.
My question is to Mr. Epstein. It concerns the Inter-American Convention and its Protocol. I have been reading the Protocol as a reservation
of rights on the taking of evidence that applies to both the United States
and Mexico. Some judges have pointed out to me that the commissioner
proceeding should not be used in the United States to take deposition
testimony or get written interrogatories from a United States resident
witness implicated in litigation in Mexico.
Epstein: The provisions for letters rogatory in the Inter-American Convention should apply only to service of process.
Benjamin Aguilera, Snell & Wilmer, Phoenix, Arizona: Mr. Epstein
says that it is now taking six to twelve months to get letters rogatory.
In my experience it took twenty-two months to get it done in one instance,
only to find out at the end that the party had fled the jurisdiction where
we had requested service of process. He maintained an address in Culiacan,
but since he was not physically present there, the authority expired. It
would have been necessary to start the process again, which our client
decided not to do.
My client decided to forego obtaining letters rogatory through the
central authority. We hired an investigator to track down the defendant
and serve him directly by means of a notario pdblico who accompanied
the private investigator. When using this process, you need to inform
the client that he is foregoing execution of the judgment in Mexico.
When acting on an informal basis such as this, the judgment will not
be executed in Mexico. Fortunately, in this case, our client was able to
locate Arizona assets and received maybe thirty cents on the dollar. So
there is an avenue to serve Mexican parties informally, but you are not
going to be able to collect that judgment there.
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I
2

4
5
6
7

D. Michael Mandig, PCC No. 37028
Klaus T. Axen, FCC No. 64710
MOLLOY, JONES & DONAHUE, P.C.
33 North Stone, Suite 2100
Post Office Box 2268
Tucson, Arizona 85702
Telephone: (602) 622-3531
Attorneys for GMAC
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
PIMA

8

10

GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE
CORPORATION de MEXICO, S.A. de C.V., a)
Mexican corporation,
Plaintiff,

11
12
13
14
15
16
17

18

No. 290582
)
)

V.)

)
)
MARIO RENE TORRES SERRANO, aka
Mario Rene Torres, and MARCELA GIRON )
)
ORTEGA TORRES, aka Marcela G. Torres,
) )
husband and wife et al.,
)
Defendants.

Partial Summary Judgment in
Favor of GMAC de Mexico, S.A.
and Against
Nogales Motor, S.A. de C.V.,
Sonora Motor, S.A. de CV.,
Mario Rene Torres Serrano and
Marcela G iron Ortega Torres
(Assigned to Judge Velasco)

)
The Court has reviewed the evidence of record in this case, both

19
20

documentary and testimonial; the pleadings; the memoranda in support of and in
opposition to the Plaintiff's request for partial summary judgment, and has heard

21
22

oral arguments of counsel regarding the matter.
The Court hereby finds that the undisputed material facts regarding

23

Count One of the Complaint show that Plaintiff is entitled to judgment in its favor

24
and against certain of the Defendants on Count One.
25
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The Court therefore grants partial summary judgment on Count One
2
3

to Plaintiff and against the following Defendants in the following amounts:
1.

Against Sonora Motor, S.A. de C.V., in the sum of TWENTY

4

MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY-ONE THOUSAND FIFTY-NINE MEXICAN

5

PESOS and TWENTY-FIVE CENTAVOS (NS20,431,059.25), together with

6

prejudgment interest in the sum of EIGHTEEN MILLiON THREE HUNDRED

7

ELEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FOURTEEN AND 70/100 MEXICAN

8

PESOS (NS18,311,914.70), for a total judgment of THIRTY-EIGHT MILLION, SEVEN

9

HUNDRED FORTY-TWO THOUSAND, NINE HUNDRED SEVENTY-THREE AND

10
11

95/100 MEXICAN PESOS (N538,742,973.95).
2.

Against Nogales Motor, S.A. de C.V., in the sum of FOUR

12

MILLION TWO HUNDRED T-fRTY-ONE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED

13

NINETY-ONE MEXICAN PESOS and SEVEN CENTAVOS (N$4,231,491.07), together

14

with prejudgment interest thereon in the sum of THREE MILLION EIGHT

15

HUNDRED FORTY-EIGHT THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FORTY-EIGHT AND

16

88/100 MEXICAN PESOS (N$3,848,148.88), for a total judgment of EIGHT MILLION

17

SEVENTY-NINE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED TI-flRTY-NINE AND 95/100

18

MEXICAN PESOS (N$8,079,639.95).

19

3.

Against Mario Rene Torres Serrano and Marcela Giron Ortega

20

Torres, jointly and severally, in the sum of FORTY MILLION SIX HUNDRED

21

EIGHTY-TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FORTY-FOUR MEXICAN PESOS,

22

and THIFRTY-FIVE CENTAVOS (N$40,682,244.35), together with prejudgment

23

interest thereon in the sum of THIRTY-SIX MILLION FIVE HUNDRED EIGHTEEN

24

THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED TWENTY-EIGHT AND 45/100 MEXICAN PESOS

25

($N36,518,828.45), for a total judgment of SEVENTY-SEVEN MILLION TWO
MOLLOY.JONES&D ONAHUEP C.
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I

HUNDRED ONE THOUSAND SEVENTY-iWO AND 80/100 MEXICAN PESOS

2

(N$77,201,072.80).

3
4
5

4.

Each and all of the foregoing amounts shall bear interest at the

rate of one hundred fifteen percent per annum (115%) from May 1, 1995, until paid.
DATED

this

&day

of

t,

6

'Eirnardo P. Velasco
Superior Court Judge

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
]ONS & DOWARU. PC
MOLLOY.
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D. Michael Mandig, PCC No. 37028
Klaus T. Axen, PCC No. 64710
MOLLOY, JONES & DONAIE-, P.C.
33 North Stone, Suite 2100
Post Office Box 2268
Tucson, Arizona 85702
Telephone: (602) 622-3531
Attorneys for GMAC
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIMA
GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE
CORPORATION de MEXICO, S.A. de C.V., a)
Mexican corporation,
No. 290582
Plaintiff,

)
Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law Regarding Plaintiff's
Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment

V.

MARIO RENE TORRES SERRANO, aka
Mario Rene Torres, and MARCELA GERON
ORTEGA TORRES, aka Marcela G. Torres,
husband and wife et al.,

)

)
)

(Assigned to Judge Velasco)

Defendants.

On January 26, 1995, this Court issued its minute entry granting
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and directed Plaintiff to file a
proposed form of judgment. In accordance with Rule 56(d) of the Arizona Rules of
Civil Procedure, the Court now makes the following Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Subject

A.

1

Matter Jurisdiction.
1.

3

This action was commenced on January 27, 1993. Insofar as

4

pertinent to the Partial Summary Judgmnent hereby granted, the action alleges, in

5

Count One of the Complaint, that Defendants owe Plaintiff, collectively, the total

6

sum of $12.7 million. The basis of Count One is alleged breach of five consignment
and five guarantee agreements entered into between Plaintiff and the Defendants.

7

2.

8
9

Article 6, Section 14, of the Constitution of the State of Arizona

states that this Court has original subject matter jurisdiction of "cases in which the

10

demand or value of property in controversy amounts to one thousand dollars or

II

more, exclusive of interest and costs." Ariz. Const., Art. 6, Sec. 14(3).
3.

12

Because the amount in controversy in this action far exceeds the

13

minimum limits specified in the Arizona Constitution, this Court has subject

14

matter jurisdiction over the action.
B.

15

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Personal and

16

Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction.

17

4.

Sonora Motor was served in Hermosillo, Sotiora, on May 11,

18

1993, by personal notification in accord with the terms of the nter-American

19

Convention on Letters Rogatory. An order confirming the completion of service

20

under the Convention was entered by this Court on July 2, 1993.
5.

21

Guaymas Motor was served in Guaymas, Sonora, on May 13,

22

1993, by personal notification in accord with the terms of the Inter-American

23

Convention on Letters Rogatory. An order confirming the completion of service

24

under the Convention was enter by this Court on July 2, 1993.

25
26
-2MOI±0Y. JONES&
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Nogales Motor was served by service on Mario Torres on
June 10, 1993, in Tucson, Arizona, in accord with the terms of the Inter-American
Convention on Letters Rogatory.
6.

7.

4

Mario and Marcela Torres were served with process in this

5

action on July 16, 1993, by personal notification in Hermosillo, Sonora, in accord

6
7

with terms of the Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory, and an Order of
this Court, confirming the completion of service on that date, was entered by the

8

court on May 9, 1994. In addition, Mr. Mario Rene Torres Serrano was notified of

9

this action by personal service of the Summons, the Complaint and various other

10

items, on June 10, 1993, in Tucson, Arizona.

11

Defendants moved several times for dismissal based upon this
Court's asserted lack of jurisdiction over their persons. However, on June 21, 1993,
Judge John F. Kelly, of this Court, found as follows:

12
13

8.

16

"With regard to personal jurisdiction over Mr. and Mrs. Torres
and Nogales and Sonora Motor, defendant[s have] conceded that
personal jurisdiction does exist." June 21, 1993 Minute Entry, at
pp. 1-2-

17

The foregoing finding is hereby reaffirmed.

14
15

18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeks
and
judgment only against the Defendants referenced in the preceding paragraph,
Motor,
jurisdictional issues with respect to the remaining Defendants, Guaymas
9.

de C.V., are
S.A. de C.V., Caborca Motor, S.A. de C.V., and Cananea Motor, S.A.
hereby reserved for later determination.
Findings Regarding the Legal Representation of the Defendants
Against Whom Judgment Is To Be Entered.
C.

25
26
-3M
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1

All Defendants in this matter were originally represented by

10.

2
3

Mr. Richard D. Burris, Attorney at Law, admitted to practice as such in the State of
Arizona. Mr. Burris' representation of the Defendants before this Court began on

4

April 21, 1993, when Mr. Burris objected to the assertion of personal jurisdiction

5

over the individual and corporate Defendants. He continued as counsel of record

6

until August 29, 1994, when this Court granted a request that Mr. Burris be

7

permitted to withdraw as counsel for the five corporate Defendants. Mr. Burris

8

remains as counsel of record for the Defendants Mario and Marcela Torres.

9

D.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the Merits.

10

11.

Evidentiary Basis for Findings of Fact.

11

The record in this matter is extensive, consisting of numerous

12

affidavits; recorded oral testimony; the admissions contained in the pleadings and

13

other matters. The following findings of fact are based upon the matters contained

14

in the court record heretofore accumulated, including, without limitation, the items

15

listed in the Appendix to these Findings.
The Findings of the Court.

16

12.

17

The Court finds the following facts to be undisputid, material facts that

18

entitle Plaintiff to judgment on Count One in its favor and against Defendants

19

Torres, Sonora Motor and Nogales Motor:

20

a.

GMAC de Mdxico, S.A. ("GMAC") is the Plaintiff in this action.

21

During the pendency of this action, the name of GMAC was changed to, and the

22

Plaintiff GMAC is now offidally known as GMAC Holding, S.A., de C.V. GMAC is a

23

Mexican corporation which assists in the process of distribution of vehicles

24

manufactured by General Motors de Mdxico, S.A. ("GM"), and sold by GM's

25

authorized dealers in Mexico.

26
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In Mexico, GMAC assists the motor vehicle distribution process

2

utilizing a consignment plan. Under this plan, a GM dealer places orders for

3

automobiles with GM, for delivery to the dealer's lot. If GMAC participates in the

4

process, it will be billed by GM for the dealer's order, and will become the owner of

5

the inventory placed on the dealer's lot. When an independent GM dealer wishes

6

to acquire inventory under a consignment plan, the dealer will order vehicles from

7

the factory, advise GM that GMAC will underwrite the consignment of the vehicles

8

to the dealer. The General Motors plant at which the vehicle is manufactured then

9

issues a document of title (called a "factura") in the name of GMAC for any vehicle

10

to be consigned to the dealer by GMAC, and GMAC pays GM for the vehicles

11

ordered by the dealer, usually the day of or the day after GMAC is invoiced by GM.

12

(Testimony of John Carrington ("Carrington Testimony") at 32/17-34/10, June 11,

13

1993, hearing transcript.)

14

c.

GMAC entered into five, separate consignment agreements with

15

Sonora Motor S.A., de C.V., on December 22, 1984 (the "Sonora Contract"); with

16

Guaymas Motor S.A. de C.V., on May 8, 1990 (the "Guaymas Contract"); with

17

Caborca Motor S.A. de C.V., on May 27, 1984 (the "Caborca Contlact"); with Cananea

18

Motor S.A. de C.V., on December 22, 1984 (the " Cananea Contract"); and with

19

Nogales Motor S.A. de C.V., on July 11, 1991 (the "Nogales Contract") (sometimes

20

collectively referred to as the "Consignment Contracts").

21

Raymond, certified court translator, submitted as Exhibit 6 at June 11, 1993 hearing

22

on Provisional Remedy, and Consignment Contracts attached to Affidavit at tabs B,

23

C, E, G, and I).

24
25

d.

(See Affidavit of Bruce

Pursuant to the Consignment Contracts, GMAC agreed to

purchase and consign motor vehicles to the Consignee. (Consignment Coaacts,

26
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I

Page 1, Statement I, attached to Exhibit 6 at June 11, 1993 hearing on Provisional

2

Remedy at tabs B, C, E, G, and I).
e.

3

The Consignment Contracts provide for payment to GMAC on

4

the date on which the vehicle is sold or delivered to a customer or 180 days from the

5

shipping date, whichever is earlier. The Consignment Contracts specifically forbid

6

the dealerships from selling or delivering vehicles to customers unless the

7

Consignee has previously paid GMAC for the vehicles. (Consignment Contracts,

8

Paragraphs 5 and 6, attached to Exhibit 6 at June 11, 1993 hearing on Provisional

9

Remedy, at tabs B, C, E, G, and I; June 11 hearing transcript at 53/14-24 (Carrington

10
II

Testimony).)
f.

The Consignment Contracts require the Consignees to pay to

12

GMAC the price of the vehicles, and related taxes, charges, expenses, and interest.

13

(Consignment Contracts, Paragraphs 5, 6, 7 & 14, attached to Exhibit 6 at June 11, 1993

14

hearing on Provisional Remedy at tabs B, C, E, G, and I.)

15

&

The Consignment Contracts require the Consignee immediately

16

to notify GMAC of any loss or damage to the vehicles. (Consignment Contracts,

17

Paragraph 11, attached to Exhibit 6 at June 11, 1993 hearing on Fiovisional Remedy

18

at tabs B, C, E,G, and 1.)

19

h.

Mario Torres signed five separate guarantee contracts by which

20

he personally guaranteed any and all of the debts of Sonora Motor, Nogales Motor,

21

Cananea Motor, Caborca Motor and Guaymas Motor to GMAC. (Affidavit of D.

22

Michael Mandig dated September 16, 1993, attached as Exhibit 4 to Plaintiff's

23

Statement of Facts in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

24

filed September 17, 1993, and Guarantee Agreement of Cananea Motor attached to

25

Affidavit at Tab A.)

26
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Each of the Guarantee Agreements provides in the first

8

"GUARANTOR [Mario R. Torres Serrano] guarantees to
CREDITOR [GMACde Mdxico, S.A.] the prompt payment of all
drafts, vouchers, promissory notes, bills of exchange, letters of
credit or other securities or documents of credit, by which
CREDITOR would become the creditor of DEBTOR [each of the
five dealerships] either at a present or future time, by virtue of
DEBTOR being the debtor, maker, acceptor, endorser, guarantor,
or simple signer of the stated documents; he also guarantees
complete performance of all present and future liabilities Debtor
has or may later incur for any reason whatsoever toward
1
CREDITOR."

9

(Guarantee Agreement of Cananea Motor, Clause 1, attached to

3
4

6
7
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10

Exhibit 4 to Plaintiff's Statement of Facts in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial

11

Summary Judgment filed September 17, 1993, at tab A.)

12

j.

In December 1992, GMAC representatives discovered that 755

13

vehicles were missing from the inventory of the Torres Dealerships, vehicles for

14

which GMAC had not been paid as required by the Consignment Contracts.

15

(Carrington Testimony, page 59/20-60/22, transcript of June 11, 1993, hearing;

16

Affidavit of John Carrington, r1, dated January 27, 1993, attached to the Complaint;

17

Affidavit of George Corwin attached to Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Motion
to Dismiss as Exhibit 57.)

19

k.

Mr. Carrington, then the credit manager of GMAC, and

20

Mr. George Corwin, President of GMAC and Mexico City Branch Manager, met with

21

Mario Torres in early December 1992. Mr. Torres did not dispute that more than 700

22

vehicles were missing from the Torres Dealership lots and that payment to GMAC

23
24

25

1
The only difference between the guarantee agreements is that the contract by which
Torres guaranteed the indebtedness of Sonora Motor has the quoted language in its Second Clause, not
the First. Otherwise, the operative clauses are as translated above, and 'are identical in each of the
five guarantees.

26
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I

forthese vehicles was due and owing. Mr. Torres told Mr. Carrington and

2

Mr. Corwin that the missing vehicles had been sold, and claimed that various banks

3

owed the Dealerships approximately half of the debt owing to GMAC, or 20 billion

4

pesos, because customers to whom the vehicles had been delivered had financed the

5

purchase of the vehicles through the banks, but the banks had yet to pay the

6

dealerships. Mr. Torres stated that he had received payment for half of the missing
vehicles, but that he had used these sums to restructure bank debt. (Carrington

7
8
9

Testimony, pp. 61/11-62/24, 81/23-82/14; Testimony of George Corwin, Jr. ("Corwin
Testimony"), pp. 99/2-10, 121/17-122/4, June 11, 1993, hearing transcript).
1.

10

Mr. Corwin (President of GMAC and M6xico City Branch

1I

Manager, both in December 1992, and at the time of his testimony in June 1993)

12

verified Mr. Torres' admissions concerning having sold cars and not paid GMAC, as

13

Mr. Corwin personally determined, by reference to Sonora Motor records, that

14

Sonora Motor took delivery of and sold at least 80% of the Missing Vehicles

15

attributable to that dealership, and did so without paying GMAC. Mr. Corwin made

16

this verification by comparing the serial numbers .f the missing vehicles shown in

17

GMAC's own inventory reports with the serial numbers of vehicles listed as sold

18

units in Sonora Motor's computer records. Mr. Corwin had reviewed 80% of the

19

dealership's records. However, before Corwin could complete the review of Sonora

20

Motor's records, the records disappeared. (Corwin Testimony, pp. 158/14-161/8,

21

June 11, 1993, hearing transcript).
13.

22

More than 180 days have expired since any of the 755 vehicles

23

were delivered to any of the Torres dealerships. (Carrington Testimony, pp. 55/13-

24

56/18, June 11, 1993, hearing transcript), and under Clause Six of the Consignment

25
26
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agreements the Defendant dealers are therefore liable to Plaintiff for the prices of all
vehicles delivered and not otherwise paid for.
14(a) As of April 30, 1995, the following amounts were owed to GMAC
de M4xico, S.A., principal and interest, denominated in pesos:

DEALERSHIP

PRINCIPAL AMOUNT

I

INTEREST TO 4/30/Q5

SONORA MOTOR

N$20,431,059.25

N$18,311,914 70

NOGALES MOTOR

4,231,491.07

3,848,148.88

CANANEA MOTOR

4,681,793.23

4,200,006.02

GUAYMAS MOTOR

7,435,110.93

6,641,912.26

CABORCA MOTOR
TOTAL OWED BY ALL
DEALERSHIPS

3,902,789.87

3,516,846.59

N$40,682,244.35

N$36,518,828.45

16.

Under chapter VII, article 340, of the Civil Code of the State of

Sonora, and absent a valid, properly recorded agreement between the spouses to the
contrary, debts contracted during the marriage by either spouse are obligations of the
"sociedad legal" (what Arizona would call the "marital community") and may be
satisfied out of the property of the "sociedad legal" or its proceeds. There are
exceptions to this rule set out in article 341, but the evidence before the Court does
not indicate the exceptions are applicable here, so that entry of judgment against Mr.
and Mrs. Torres, jointly and severally, under the guarantees is appropriate. (See

-9)ONES&
MOLLOY.
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1

Affidavit of D. Michael Mandig, dated February 22, 1994, attached as Exhibit I to

2

GMAC's Statement of Facts in Support of Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Partial

3

Summary Judgment.)

4

DATED this A

dayof

5
7

- P.Velasco
B -ardo
Superior Court Judge

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
i5
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
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APPEIMIX C

D. Michael Mandig, Pima County Computer No. 37028
Michael W. Baldwin, Pima County Computer No. 2464
MOLLOY, JONEs & DONAHU, P.C.
33 North Stone, Suite 2100
Post Office Box 2268
Tucson, Arizona 85702
Telephone: (602) 622-3531
Attorneys for GMAC
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF TH:E STATE OF ARIZONA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIMA
GENERAL MOTOR ACCEPTANCE
CORPORATION de MEXICO, S.A. de C.V., a)
)
Mexican corporation,

)

Plaintiff

)
)

v.

)

MARIO RENE TORRES SERRANO, aka
Mario Rene Torres, and MARCELA GIRON
ORTEGA TORRES, aka Marcela G. Torres,
husband and wife; SONORA MOTOR S.A.
de C.V., a Mexican corporation; CABORCA )
MOTOR S.A. de C.V., a Mexican corporation; GUAYMAS MOTOR S.A. de C.V., a
Mexican corporation; CANANA MOTOR
)
S.A. de C.V., a Mexican corporation;
NOGALES MOTOR S.A. de C.V., a Mexican )
corporation; JOHN DOES 1-10; JANE DOES
1-10; XYZ CORPORATIONS 1-10; and THE
UNKNOWN HEIRS OR DEVISEES OF ANY)
OF THE ABOVE PARTIES, IF DECEASED,
Defendants

No. 290582
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW WITH
RESPECT TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF
LETTERS OF REQUEST FOR THE
GATHERING OF EVIDENCE IN
MEXICO

)

With respect to the Plaintiffs request that this court issue Letters of
Request in accordance with the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence
Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, the Court makes the following preliminary
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I

findings. These findings are based on the evidence presented to the court to date,

2

and do not constitute a binding resolution of factual or legal issues in this case.

3

They are made in order to aid the Sonoran courts asked to execute the

4

accompanying Letters of Request in understanding the importance of the requested

5

information to the resolution of issues pending before this Court.

6
7
8
9
10

Based upon the record before this Court, and good cause having been
shown for the making of preliminary findings, the Court finds as follows:
A.

Findings Required by the Hague Convention on the Taking of

Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters.
1.

The Republic of Mexico and the United States of America are

11

parties to the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or

12

Commercial Matters (referred to herein as the Evidence Convention).

13

Convention became effective on December 24, 1989.

14

2.

The Evidence

The Evidence Convention, as acceded to by Mexico, requires the

15

Courts of Mexico to execute Letters of Request for collection of evidence, provided

16

the Letters follow the format prescribed by the Convention. With respect to the

17

production of documents for inspection and copying prior to trial, the Evidence

18

Convention requires competent Mexican tribunals to execute such requests if (a) a

19

civil action is pending in the United States of America, (b) the requested documents

20

are reasonably identified as to date, subject and other relevant information, and (c)

21

the Letters of Request show a direct relationship between the evidence or

22

information sought and the pending proceeding.

23
24

a.

There is an action pending before the Superior Court of Arizona,

in and for the County of Pima, entitled as shown in the above caption.

25
MOU.DY.
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The information sought through the accompanying Letters of

Request is directly relevant to the issues raised in this action.
c.

The relevance of the requested information is described in the

4

following findings as to relevance and materiality. Reasonable identification of the

5

information and documents sought, as to date, subject and the like, is found in the

6

following findings and in the specific description of the documents sought, attached

7

to the Letters of Request as Appendix "A".
Findings Regarding Materiality and Relevancy of, and Need for

8

B.

9

the Requested Information.

10

1. On January 27, 1993, Plaintiff, General Motor Acceptance

11

Corporation de Mexico ("GMAC"), filed a civil action against the above named

12

Defendants for breach of contract, fraud and constructive trust, and conversion.

13

This action is currently pending before this court. Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that

14

GMAC entered into consignment agreements with five Sonoran automobile

15

dealerships: Sonora Motor S.A. de C.V., a Mexican corporation; Caborca Motor S.A.

16

de C.V., a Mexican corporation; Guaymas Motor, S.A. de C.V., a Mexican

17

corporation; Cananea Motor S.A. de C.V., a Mexican corporation; and Nogales

18

Motor S.A. de C.V., a Mexican corporation. Mario Torres, who is the majority

19

owner of the five automobile dealerships, entered into Guaranty Agreements with

20

the plaintiff GMAC by which he guaranteed the corporate indebtedness owed under

21

the Consignment Agreements. This action makes the following allegations:

22
23
24
25

a.

The Complaint alleges that, pursuant to the Consignment

of each
Agreements, GMAC consigned vehicles owned by GMAC to the possession
of the dealerships, to be offered for sale by the dealer. It is further alleged that
GMAC was to be paid by the dealer for each vehicle prior to any retail sale to a

MOLLOY.
JONE &LDONANL M
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I

purchaser. It is also alleged that, between April 1, 1992 and January 1993, at least 755

2

automobiles were consigned by GMAC to the dealerships. The Court finds that it is

3

undisputed that these vehicles disappeared from the dealership lots without

4

payment to GMAC.

5

b.

GMAC has also made a claim against Torres and the five

6

dealerships for violation of Arizona's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

7

Organizations Act ("RICO") for damages and other relief stemming from

8

Defendants' alleged laundering of monies through Torres' business and personal

9

bank accounts in Arizona. Plaintiffs also allege, and have offered some proof

10

tending to show, that funds generated by the sale of GMAC vehicles consigned to

11

the dealerships found their way directly into the personal, Arizona accounts of Mr.

12

and Mrs. Torres.
2. Plaintiff has provided this court with bank records and statements

13
14

from Bank One of Arizona (fka Valley National Bank) with respect to accounts

15

maintained by Defendants Nogales Motor, S.A., Sonora Motor, S.A., and Mario and

16

Marcela Torres. These bank records evince the existence of the following accounts

17

during the following time periods:

18

a. From 1990 to the present date, the Defendant Nogales Motor,

19

S.A., maintained and maintains a business checking account, account number 2108-

20

7926, at the Nogales, Arizona branch of Bank One.
b. From March 30, 1989, to the present date, the Defendants

21
22

Mario and Marcela Torres maintained and maintains a personal checking account,

23

account number 2088-6515, at the Williams Centre Office of Bank One in Tucson,

24

Arizona.

25
4OLLOY.
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3

Sonora Motor, S.A., maintained and maintains a business checking account, account
number 2001-8582, at the Willians Centre Office of Bank One in Tucson, Arizona.
d. From December 18, 1983, to the present date, the Defendants

4
5

Mario and Marcela Torres maintained and maintains a money market account,

6

account number 3550-6407 at the Williams Centre Office of Bank One in Tucson,

7

Arizona.
3. The Bank One records and statements show that large sums of

8
9
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c. From February 6, 1981, to the present date, the Defendant

1
2
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money were transferred from four banks in Mexico (Banamex in Nogales, Sonora;

10

Banco del Atlantico in Hermosillo, Sonora; Banca Serfin SNC in Hermosillo,

11

Sonora; and Bancomer in Nogales, Sonora) to the Defendants' various Bank One

12

accounts.

13

4. Between 1990 and the present date, Defendant Nogales Motor, S.A.,

14

caused at least $798,464.00 to be transferred from four Mexican banks and deposited

15

into its business account, account number 2108-7926, at Bank One in Nogales,

16

Arizona.'

17

from each bank located in Mexico are as follows:

The monies which have thus far been found to have been transferred

a. Bancomer in Nogales, Sonora, transferred $738,464.00 into the

18
19

Nogales Motor Bank One account.
b. Banamex in Nogales, Sonora, transferred $32,500.00 into the

20
21

Nogales Motor Bank One account.

22
23
24
25

'The court also finds that there are some $2,087,260.14 in additional
wire transfers into the four Arizona bank accounts, but Banc One has not provided
any documentary explanation for these deposits. It may be that these additional
wire transfers came from the Mexican banks referenced above, and the Mexican
bank records may well shed light on this issue, which is material to the questions
before the court in the Arizona litigation.
MOLO. JONO & DOM"UL F.7
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c. Banco Serfin in Hermosillo, Sonora, transferred $21,000.00

1
2
3
4
5

into the Nogales Motor Bank One account.
d. Banco del Atlantico in Hermosillo, Sonora, transferred
$6,500.00 into the Nogales Motor Bank One account.
5. Between March 30, 1989, and the present date, Defendants Mario and

6

Marcela Torres caused at least $150,419.21 to be transferred from two Mexican banks

7

and deposited into their Bank One personal checking account, account number 2088-

8

6515, at the Williams Centre Office of Bank One in Tucson, Arizona. The monies

9

transferred from each bank located in Mexico is as follows:

10
11
12
13
14

a. Banco Serfin in Hermosillo, Sonora, transferred $37,919.21
into the Torres' Bank One personal checking account.
b. Banco del Atlantico in Hermosillo, Sonora, transferred
S1 12,500.00 into the Torreses' Bank One personal checking account
6. Between February .6, 1981 and the present date, Defendant Sonora

15

Motor, S.A., caused at least S46,353.87 to be transferred from Mexican banks and

16

deposited into its business account, account number 2001-7926, at the Williams

17

Centre Office of Bank One in Tucson, Arizona. The monies transferred from each

18

bank located in Mexico is as follows:

19
20
21
22

a. Bancomer in Nogales, Sonora, transferred $25,000.00 into the
Sonora Motor Bank One business account.
b. Banco del Atlantico in Hermosillo, Sonora, transferred
$21,353.87 into the Sonora Motor Bank One business account.

23

7. Between February 6, 1981 and the present date, Defendants Mario

24

and Marcela Torres caused at least $8,500.00 to be transferred from Mexican banks

25
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1

and deposited into their personal money market account, account number 3550-

2
3

6407, at the Williams Centre Office of Bank One in Tucson, Arizona.
a. Banco del Atlantico in Hermosillo, Sonora, transferred

4

58,500.00 into the Torreses' Bank One personal money market account.

5
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8. The total sums of money thus far found to have been transferred

6
7

from each Mexican Bank to the Defendants' various Bank One accounts, broken
down by bank, are as follows:

8
9

a. Bancomer in Nogales, Sonora, transferred at least $763,464.00
to the Defendants' above-mentioned accounts.
b. Banco del Atlantico in Hermosillo, Sonora, transferred at least

10
11

S148,853.87 to the Defendants' above-mentioned accounts.
c. Banca Serfin SNC in Hermosillo, Sonora, transferred at least

12
13

S58,919.21 to the Defendants' above-mentioned accounts.
d. Banamex in Nogales, Sonora, transferred at least $32,500 to

14
15

the Defendants' above-mentioned accounts.
9. Because of the fund transfers from Mexico into Arizona, there is a

16
17

direct relationship between the Defendants' Mexican bank records and the issues in

18

dispute in the Arizona case.
10. Analysis of Defendants' Mexican bank records is necessary to prove

19
20

the extent to which, if at all, the following may have occurred:
a. The Defendants commingled corporate and personal funds.
b. The Defendants.failed to make payments to GMAC upon the

21
22
23

sale of the consigned automobiles.
c. The Defendants deposited monies received in payment for the

24
25

sale of GMAC's automobiles into their own accounts.
wO".OY.JOI
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d. The Defendants transferred monies received in payment for

I

2
3

the sale of GMAC's automobiles from their Mexican bank accounts to other Mexican
bank accounts and to Arizona bank accounts.
e. The Defendants Mario and Marcela Torres used monies

4
5

received in payment for the sale of GMAC's automobiles to purchase goods and

6
7

services for their personal use, including the real and personal property which they
own or attempted to acquire in Arizona.

8
9

f. The location and amount of monies in the Defendants'
possession, ixe., bank accounts, which are due and owing to GMAC.

10
11

11. This Court has a legitimate interest in the dealings between GMAC,
Torres and the dealerships for at least two important reasons:

12
13

Mr. and Mrs. Torres hold themselves out as residents of the state
of Arizona, with a primary residence owned by them and located in Tucson,

14

Arizona.

a.

b.

15

If Plaintiff is able to prove the allegations of its Complaint, as

17

amended, then Mr. and Mrs. Torres, and their dealerships, will be shown to have
used the banking system of the State of Arizona for what are, under the laws of the

18

State of Arizona, illegal and improper purposes.

19

12. Examination of an officer or employee of each of the Mexican banks
is necessary to understand the bank's records, the relationship between the Mexican
banks and the Arizona banks, and the bank's method of conducting business with

16

20
21
22

the Defendants in this action.
DATED TIS /

23

day of -Geteber, 1993.
F. KELLY

24fOHN

A

Superior Court Judge /

25
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